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BRAZILIAN STATES TAX WAR
EXPLAINED BY THE PROPERTY RIGHT
THEORIES OF LAW AND ECONOMICSFAKE REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES
LEADING TO UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Fdbio Roberto Castilho and Rodrigo Frota Silveira*

ABSTRACT
The most important tax in Brazil is the ICMS, a kind of value-added
tax (VAT), rendered by the Brazilian State. In the last decades, Brazilian
states engaged in a ferocious competition process of concession of illegal
ICMS benefits. In such process, local authorities provide local firms with
fake ICMS tax receipts that are used to reduce the ICMS paid in other
states of the Brazilian Federation. Such actions are frequently justified as
attempts to promote economic development in states of the Brazilian
Federation where economic development is most needed. This paper's
central objective is to prove that the ICMS Tax War [hereinafter Tax War]
policies are aggressions to property rights motivated by an attempt of
local governments to increase their own levels of taxation. The paper
also attempts to demonstrate, as the secondary objective, that the kind of
investment attracted by the Tax War is opportunistic and has low specific
assets, generating poor or no local positive economic externalities. If the
paper's central objective is true, the tax system currently implemented in
Brazil contributes to generating underdevelopment, given that, in the Tax
War environment, productive investments demanding high specific assets
tend not to prevail in the competition with players that take opportunistic
advantage of illegal tax privileges granted by Brazilian states. The conclusions on the illicit use of tax competition transcend the Brazilian experience, being also useful for countries that intend to sign international
agreements on taxation (such as in the income tax field) or engage in the
formation of Free Trade Areas and Economic Communities.
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INTRODUCTION

HIS paper focuses on the Brazilian tax system and, more specifically, illegal state competition for tax revenues as an underdevelopment factor. Our field of analysis is the ICMS, a staterendered VAT that is the most important tax in Brazil in terms of
revenue.
Douglas North states that third-world countries are poor because their
institutions do not encourage productive investments.' A tax system,
given the importance of its interference on microeconomic decisions, is
one of the most important institutions, leading to optimal or suboptimal
economic performance. The Brazilian Constitution allows the ICMS paid
in one state of the Brazilian Federation to be combined with the ICMS to
be paid to other states. 2 The compensation system works based on reciprocity of credit acceptance.
In the last decades, Brazilian states engaged in a ferocious competition
process of concession of illegal tax benefits. In such process, local authorities provide local firms with fake ICMS tax receipts to be used to reduce
the ICMS to be paid in other states. Illicit local policies are often justified
as redistributive actions that can bring economic development to the
most needed states of the Brazilian Federation. This paper attempts to
demystify Tax War policies.
This paper's central hypothesis is that the practice of illegal ICMS tax
benefits is actually motivated by an attempt of local governments to increase their own collected ICMS. Regional development may be a secondary or irrelevant issue in such decisions. This hypothesis will be tested
by evaluating the kind of ICMS tax benefits provided by Brazilian state
governments and by analyzing the per capita income levels of citizens of
the states that are engaged in the promotion of the Tax War. To do so,
the paper presents two case studies. The first case is the awkward concentration of medicine distributors in the Brazilian Federal District and in
the states of Goids and Espfrito Santo, far from the industry and the consumers. The second case is the important alteration of distribution of the
ICMS collected on imports of raw material for beer manufacturing (e.g.,
malt), caused by the collection of ICMS benefits in the state of Santa
Catarina, in dissociation with any increase on the level of local productive
investments, employment, or even activity in seaports.
The secondary hypothesis, used to support the central one, is that activities attracted by illegal tax benefits tend to be, and actually are, low specific asset investments, incapable of generating substantial and permanent
positive externalities for the regions in which they are established. Such
characteristic of investments attracted by the Tax War is related to the
lack of certainty of the permanence of competitive advantages provided
1. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(James Alt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
2. Constituiqdo Federal do Brasil de 1988, artigo 155, § 20
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by illegal benefits. The secondary hypothesis is tested through the analysis of which kind of firms were attracted to the states of the Brazilian
center-western region after the promulgation of the Brazilian 1988 Constitution, a landmark for the establishment of a never-ending, multiple
player, and successive move game named the Tax War.
In proving this hypothesis, the paper refutes the commonly accepted
association of the Tax War and the redistribution of riches and the justification of legal transgressions by the greater good of reduction of regional
inequalities in the Brazilian Federation. This paper attracts attention to
the fact that the Tax War can only be regarded as an aggression against
property rights, a cause of instability, and a generator of poverty. The
Tax War only provides tax privileges to opportunistic players and, in doing so, sacrifices the financial return expected by those who are willing to
invest in firms that demand high specific assets and can promote longterm positive externalities for the communities in which they are
established.
This paper also presents to the academic community an example of the
application of legal and economic theories to federalist relationships and
their potential use for the improvement of taxation systems. The lessons
arising out of the analysis might be valuable, not only in terms of helping
the decision-making process with respect to Brazilian tax system design,
but also as a comparative example for countries that intend to sign international agreements on taxation (such as in the income tax field) or engage in the formation of free trade areas and economic communities.
This paper is divided into five parts: (i) Part one: corresponding to this
introduction; (ii) Part two: a brief presentation of Barzel's and Eggertsson's legal and economic property rights theories and of North's theory
on underdevelopment, on which this paper is based; (iii) Part three: an
explanation of the Tax War according to Barzel and Eggertsson; (iv) Part
four: Tax War case studies; and (v) Part five: conclusion, a North-based
evaluation of the profile of firms attracted by the unlawful tax benefits
and the impact of the Tax War on the national economy.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK-BARZEL'S AND
EGGERTSON'S THEORY ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
The property rights theory according to law and economics distinguishes itself from the property rights theories studied in Brazilian law
schools, establishing itself apart from the studies of the classic line of
thoughts provided by Roman law and private law theories of continental
Europe. 3 According to Barzel, property rights may be classified into two
basic types of rights: economic rights and legal property rights. 4 Eco3. Legal studies in Brazil are highly influenced by Roman Law. The Brazilian legal
system is remarkably influenced by Italian, French, German, and Portuguese theories on law and by the legal systems of those countries.
4. YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (James Alt &
Douglass North eds., 1989) (1997).
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nomic property rights are defined as the rights an individual has over
goods, generating expectations of future profits or benefits, such as income, use, or consumption. 5 Legal property fights, on the other hand,
are tools to support the economic rights, guarantying that the economic
rights will be respected by individuals and by the State. In such a concept, economic goals are the final goals reached through property, with
the law being an instrument to achieve such goals.
Barzel also states that property rights and transaction costs are closely
related: "I define transaction costs as the costs associated with the transfer, capture, and protection of rights.' 6 Once property rights are not perfectly delimited, an increase in transaction costs will be experienced.
Each transaction will be accompanied by value dissipation. Given both
the complexity of attributes of a given good and the costs incurred to
precisely delimit property rights, in the real world, property rights will
always be less than perfectly delimited. Thus, transaction costs will always be positive and recurrent, causing income and value dissipation.
Still, according to Barzel, the value of a good tends to decrease if the
income or utilities to be generated to its owner can be altered by other
individuals without the need of reparation. 7 An efficient way to increase
the value of a good is to impose that anyone that causes a decrease in the
expected income or utility to be provided by the goods is forced to compensate the owner for the losses experienced. Given the rule imposing
reparation, the owner will be the individual with the greatest power to
alter the value of a good. Proper care and protection of the goods are
stimulated by the owner responsible for such activities, for he will be the
one facing the consequences of his own behavior. By stimulating individuals to maximize the value of the goods they own, a proper behavior towards the care for the goods owned can be expected. So, the rule that
internalizes the consequences of proper behavior towards the goods
owned also maximizes social welfare. That consequence will be experienced in several different spheres of human interaction, such as the market, families, firms, government, and any other organizations.
The State has a major role in delimiting property rights, under both
legal and economic perspectives, as the State is entitled to set rules on
property rights; to solve disputes between individuals; and to enforce laws
and administrative and judicial decisions. Eggertsson states that when
there are imperfections on the definition of property rights and insufficient enforcement of property fights, goods will become things without
owners. 8 Following this, people will dissipate resources in order to capture portions of the available good. 9 This theoretical framework, along
with North's explanation on poverty, is key to this paper and allows a
5.
6.

BARZEL.
BARZEL.

supra note 4.
supra note 4.

7.

B.,RZEL. supra note 4.

8. Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions 89 (Mark Perlman and
E. Roy Weintraub eds., 1990).
9. Id. at 90-91.
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different perspective of analysis of the tax competition of Brazilian states,
known as the Tax War.
III.

ICMS TAX WAR-LAW AND ECONOMICS PROPERTY
RIGHTS THEORY APPLIED

A. A

GENERAL VIEW ON ICMS

Brazil is a Federative State with twenty-six states and one Federal District. According to the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, states (and
the Federal District) are competent to institute and levy some tax, among
which is the Tax on Circulation of Goods, Transportation, and Communication Services-ICMS. ICMS is the most important Brazilian tax in
terms of revenue, corresponding to 21.8 percent of total Brazilian tax revenues (7.8 percent of Brazilian GDP) or 83.6 percent of the gross tax
revenue of the states of the Brazilian Federation.' 0 ICMS is a kind of
VAT, charged on every step of circulation of goods, both in intrastate and
interstate transactions." ICMS is due on sales and goods transferences
and is calculated on the value of each sale performed by a taxpayer. In a
simplified way, it can be stated that each distribution center, store, or
industrial plant owned by a firm is considered an ICMS taxpayer in the
state where it is located.
ICMS rates vary according to the kind of goods sold on intrastate
transactions and range between 7 and 12 percent on interstate transactions between taxpayers. 12 The 7 percent rate is applicable only when a
good is sold from a seller located in the states in the regions south and
southeast of Brazil to a buyer located in the central-west, north, or north13
east regions of Brazil.
The ICMS due from a store or industrial plant to its state of location
corresponds to the ICMS charged on sales performed, minus the ICMS
10. Ministerio da Fazenda-Receita Federal, http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br (last
visited July 11, 2007).
11. The ICMS is not the first Brazilian experience with a state-charged VAT. The
former existent IVA was named ICM-Tax on Circulation of Goods, which was
levied beginning in 1965. ICMS is a kind of VAT-C. Its advantages on the sales
taxes levied only on sales to consumers are the fact that the value added on the
production chain is concentrated in a few great contributors. IVA-C fiscalization is
considered more efficient than that of the sale taxes. (Stiglitz, 2000, p.716). The
degree of voluntary accomplishment is stimulated by the intrinsic mechanism of
fiscalization, given that buyers need to register and keep documents relative to
Sales in order to be able to use credits to reduce the taxes due on sales, facilitating
(Sampaio, p.196). On the other hand, VAT-C has a series of fragilities, among
which (a) fraudulent reduction on the registered Sales, reducing taxes to be paid
(b) fraudulent increase in value or quantities of registered purchases, causing the
increase of credits to be used for compensation (c) complexity of the tax system
which has a variety of rates and tax benefits (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 7 17; Sampaio, p.368).
12. Resoluqdo do Senado Federal n' 22, de 19.05.1989.
13. The State of Espirito Santo equiparated to the States of the North, Northeast and
Center West Regions for purpose of ICMS rate applicable on interstate transactions. The Brazilian 1988 Constitution rules that such rates are to be defined by
Brazilian Senate Resolutions.

358

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15

14
indicated in the purchase documents for the goods.

The non-cumulative character of ICMS operates on a national basis.
ICMS levied on the acquisition inputs can be compensated with the
ICMS due on output sales, even when the ICMS due on inputs is charged
by one state and the ICMS on outputs is to be charged by another state of
the Brazilian Federation. 15 To simplify, this paper refers to the acceptance of ICMS input-credits on an interstate basis as the "reciprocal credit
16
acceptance rule."
National regulations set limits on state legislative competence on
ICMS, imposing, among others, that (i) ICMS is not to be charged on
export operations; (ii) rates on intrastate operations are not to be lower
than the lowest rate on interstate operations (7 percent); (iii) ICMS is due
on imports to the state of location of the importer; and (iv) any form of
ICMS tax benefits or financial benefits based on ICMS need to be previously approved unanimously by every state and need to be implemented
by a law approved with such specific purpose.
Because the ICMS due by each taxpayer is the result of the ICMS on
outputs minus the ICMS on inputs, the total ICMS to be collected by
each state will depend on the level of economic activity of sellers within
the state as well as on the interstate trade performance. Interstate merchandise acquisitions decrease, while interstate sales increase, the ICMS
collection for a given Brazilian state.
B.

TAX WAR, STATE POWER, STATE TRANSGRESSIONS,

AND

ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE ICMS POTENTIAL
TAX COLLECTION.

Any tax is a burden on an economy and dissipates richness because it
moves the demand and supply curves away from their ideal locations. So,
any tax incentive is, in principle, something good for the economy. However, tax incentives are not always legal, not always provided for the good
of competition, and not always adjusted to the interests of a national
economy's development. The Tax War provides a good example of how
vicious tax benefits might become when they represent a threat to prop17
erty rather than an incentive to productive activities.
14. "ICMS DUE" = "ICMS ON SALES" - "ICMS ON PURCHASES"
15. Some issues related to intergovernmental tax compensation are studied in the field
of income taxation and supported by rules generally established on international
agreements. Brazilian experience with ICMS, in its turn, involves multilateral
interaction.
16. The reciprocal acceptance of ICMS credits is defined in Brazilian Constitution (article 155).
17. On Brazilian ICMS Tax War: Angelo de Angelis, A GUERRA FISCAL ENTRE OS
ESTADOS BRASILEIROS. Relat6rio CAT n' 59, marqo de 2006, Sao Paulo, 2006;
Camargo, Aratijo, 1999; Glauco ARBIX, GUERRA FISCAL E COMPETI('AO INTERMUNICIPAL POR Novos INVESTIMENTOS NO SETOR AUTOMOTIVO BRASILEIRO,
Dados, Rio de Janeiro, v. 43, n. 1, 2000; Castilho ET AL., A GUERRA FISCAL QUE
NAO INTERESSA A NINGUtM. Relat6rio CAT n' 48, abril de 2005, p 28 a 34, Sao
Paulo, 2005; Gustavo Costa, 0 CONFLITO DE COMPE[rENCIA EXONERATIVA EM
MATE RIA DE ICMS: UMA ABORDAGEM POLtTrCO- JURfDICA SOBRE A "GUERRA
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Due to the design characteristics of the ICMS, there is a great economic incentive for a state to increase its own collected taxes by increasing the volume of operations charged by the ICMS within its territory.
There are basically three ways to do it. One is to stimulate economic
activity ("economic activity incentives"). Another way is to increase the
level of imports, substituting the interstate acquisition of goods or allowing the importer to perform a later interstate operation charged locally by the ICMS ("Import incentives"). A third way (which will work
only for the states of Espirito Santo or any states of the north, northeast
or central-west regions of Brazil) is to increase the level of activity of
distribution centers that acquire goods from southern or southeastern
taxpayers (at a rate of 7 percent) and sell such goods to southern or
southeastern taxpayers (at a rate of 12 percent) ("local distributor
benefits").
The methods for implementing these policies are based on transgressions of the national rules on the ICMS. This involves abuse of power by
the executive (state governors or state treasury secretaries) and, most frequently, fraudulent issuance of tax documents. The abuse of power corresponds to the violation of the constitutional rule demanding that a law,
issued according to an interstate agreement, be approved in order to create an ICMS benefit. 18 The problems related to the abuse of power are
corruption and compensatory measures for fiscal equilibrium (increase of
Revista Tributiria e de Finanqas Ptiblicas
n°42. Ano 10. Sao Paulo. Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2002; Ferreira et al., INTER-JURISDICTIONAL FISCAL COMPETITION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 25 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, n' 3 (99),
295-313 (2005); Sdrgio Guimardes Ferreira, GUERRA FISCAL: COMPETI(AO
TRIBUTARIA OU CORRIDA Ao FUNDO DO TACHO? BNDES, Informe-Se, N' 4,
Rio de Janeiro, Janeiro, 2000; MARCOS LIMA FRANCO & JORGE NETO, Texto para
Discussao N.' 226, INCENTIVOS, EQUILIBRIO OR(4AMENTARIO E BEM-ESTAR: Os
EFEITOS DA GUERRA Fiscal. P6s-graduaqdo em Economia - CAEN, Universidade
Federal do CearA, Julho de 2001; Andrea Lemgruber, A COMPETIQAO
FISCAL" NA FEDERA AO BRASILEIRA,

TRIBUTARIA

EM

ECONOMIAS

FEDERATIVAS:

ASPECTOS

TEORICOS,

CON-

Do CASO BRASILEIRO, UNB, Mestrado,
Brasilia, March 1999; Hugo de Brito Machado, Os PRINCfPIOS JURIDICOS DA
STATA( OES EMPfRICAS E UMA ANALISE

1988. Sao Paulo/SP, Dial6tica (4th ed. 2001);
Henrique Shiguemi Nakagaki, A GUERRA FISCAL E 0 CONTRIBUINTE PAULISTA.
Valor Econmico, Sao Paulo, January 2005; R. NELSON, STATE COMPETITION FOR
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL: THE CASE OF DELL COMPUTER, Brown
Journal of World Affairs, 2002; Regis Oliveira, FEDERALISMO FISCAL E PACTO
FEDERATIVO, Revista Tributdria e de Finanqas Ptiblicas, n' 61, RT, 2005; Marcelo
PIANCASTELLI & Fernando Perobelli, ICMS: EVOLU¢AO RECENTE E GUERRA FISCAL. TEXTO PARA DISCuSSAo 402. IPEA, 1996; S6rgio Prado & Carlos Eduardo
G. CACALCANTE, A GUERRA FISCAL NO BRASIL. IPEA, FAPESP, Ediq6es
FUNDAP, 2000; Rodrigo Frota Silveira,.ICMS: FRAGILIDADES, FRAUDES,
TRIBUTAQAO NA CONSTITUIQAO DE

BENEFICIOS E GUERRA

FISCAL. 10 SEMINARIO DE ESTUDOS TRIBUTARIOS

DA

SEFAZ-SP. Sao Paulo (SP), agosto de 2006; Ricardo Varsano, A GUERRA FISCAL
5
DO ICMS: QUEM GANHA E QUEM PERDE. IPEA, Texto para Discussao n'
00,
Brasilia, 1997.
18. According to Prado and Cavalcante, 2000, it is clear that the legal system provides
a rigid mechanism for the approval of ICMS benefits, demanding unanimously
approval of the States.
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general levels of taxation to be supported by every firm, in order to favor
one specific company).
Except for the import operations made to substitute interstate acquisitions of fixed assets of firms located in the state that provides the tax
benefit, the fraudulent issuance of fiscal documents is essential for the
efficacy of ICMS illegal benefits. Whenever a seller makes an interstate
transaction, it will write several types of information on the fiscal documents used to register the transaction and transport the goods sold. According to national ICMS legislation, the buyer, physical destination,
nature of the good sold, nature of the transaction, value of the transaction, and ICMS charged should be indicated.1 9 By decreasing the amount
of ICMS actually charged, but allowing a firm to indicate the charge in its
issued fiscal documents as if it had really taken place, a state can attract
to its territory commercial operations that would otherwise happen else20
where, according to economic efficiency criteria.
Even though the Tax War is against the law, Brazilian legal instruments
have little effect in preventing it from happening or punishing
21
transgressors.
Despite the difficulties in identifying the transactions to which illegal
ICMS benefits were provided and the relative non-effectiveness of the
institutional mechanisms available to repel the Tax War, once an illegal
ICMS benefit is identified the consequences can be impugnation of the
ICMS credits generated and the termination of the tax benefit. 2 2 Therefore, it can be affirmed that an investment based on a Tax War benefit
involves two types of risk: (i) risk of loss of the benefit itself, and (ii) risk
of imposing losses to the buyers who might have their ICMS credits im23
pugned by tax auditors.
19. Such rules are defined on Interstate Agreements, named "Convenios" Most of
the rules on standardization of ICMS fiscal documents are provided by a Convenio
celebrated in 1970.
20. The case studies will provide an illustration of this.
21. The enforcement inefficiency understanding demands specific knowledge of Brazilian Judiciary System and of the Brazilian Supreme Court's (STF) way of understanding the Tax War. It would be better explained by a specific study, but the
causes of it can be anticipated as being slowness of Judiciary and the lack of specific sanctions to public agents which break the law to provide tax benefits. According to VIOL, 1998, ICMS Tax war is an internal competitive process taking
place in Brazilian Federation and consistent of the illegal and disorientated providence of ICMS benefits, with the purpose of attracting private investments. The
problem of Tax Competition in Brazil has its origin in the disconnection of theory
and practice in institutional terms, resulting in the implementation of taxation
models to which institutions are not ready to bare.
22. The termination of the benefit is generally determined by a judicial decision that
declares the unconstitutionality of the law or decree that creates the tax benefit.
The credits are impugned by administrative acts of the Tax Revenue Services of
the State where the buyer is located.
23. The Tax Revenue Services actions towards illegally generated credits were intensified from 2005 on, especially in the state of Sao Paulo. Over 2 billion reais in tax
fines were already applied due to the use of credits generated in the context of Tax
War. (Source-Sao Paulo State Treasury)
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APPLIED THEORY-How CAN BARZEL AND EGGERTSON

CONTRIBUTE TO THE EXPLANATION OF BRAZILIAN TAX WAR

Some authors try to justify the Tax War as a consequence of the regional inequalities of the Brazilian Federation. Under such perspective,
the tax benefits, in spite of being illegal, are presented as tools to promote
regional development. 2 4 Based on Barzel's writings, however, this paper
presents the Tax War as a violation of property rights. One kind of property rights violation is the decrease of the total ICMS to be collected by
other states of the Brazilian Federation, caused by the tax policies of
states that provide illegal ICMS benefits. Another kind of property rights
violation is the negative impact on the value of tangible and intangible
assets of competitors who will have their profit expectations lowered by
the market changes caused by a player acting within privileged conditions. A less visible kind of property violation will correspond to the
compensatory measures taken by the affected states, generally the increase of taxation of goods less subject to the Tax War (e.g., electricity,
25
fuel, and telecommunications).
The actual size of the aggression (or the potential harm to property
consistent with an ICMS illegal benefit) is hard to estimate by the time an
illegal benefit is created. First, the size is difficult to estimate because
there is no necessary relationship between the volume of credits to be
spread and the amount of private capital invested in the provider state.
And second, the size is difficult to estimate because the benefit created
does not represent a budget sacrifice for the provider state. Any extra
operation attracted will positively affect the tax collection of the state
that provides the benefit. Thus, there is little incentive for a provider
state to control how many credits are spread to beneficiary firms.2 6
In this Tax War environment, economic and legal aspects of property
are jeopardized, as the value of assets tends to be externally influenced.
24. Some authors, among which Hugo de Brito Machado (2004), deny the institutional
problems related to Tax War, affirming that it is a legitimate attempt of poorer
Brazilian States to achieve economic development. According to the author, only
the ICMS provided by rich States are against the Constitution, since the greater
good of reduction of regional inequalities justifies legal transgressions.
25. Luis Carlos Vitali Bordin, Carga Tributaria Brasileira em 2002, BNDES, (2003),
http://www.bndes.gov.br/clientes/federativo/bf-bancos/eOOO1919.pdf.
Bordin observes that the collection of ICMS dropped until 1999, starting to recover after that
year. Such facts jeopardize the prediction of ICMS fallacy due to the Fiscal War.
The author states that the increase of collection from 1999 on occurs in the fields
of fuel, electricity and telecommunications, economic activities of high growth in
such period due to privatizations. Bordin estimates that around 40% of the total
ICMS collection comes from those blue-chips.
26. Greater increases in the amount of operations (or even in the amounts indicated in
fiscal documents) will provide extra tax revenues for the state of location of the
document issuer. In such conditions there is little interest in controlling the actual
volume of credits spread by a beneficiary firm. There is, inclusively, a great room
for frauds, since any fraudulent increase in the amount of credits generated or
exaggeration in the number of transactions will be beneficial for the state where
the issuer is located. The authorities competent to audit the beneficiary will have
little or no interest in controlling the volume of credits spread.
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27
That will cause dissimulation of proper care by the owners.
By applying Eggertson's theories, both the possibility of increasing the
ICMS revenue by attracting operations to a given state territory and the
possibility of generating ICMS credits in amounts that overcome the
taxes actually collected are potentially valuable goods with no predefined
owners. After the existence of such goods (with no owners) is noticed,
local governments and commercial and industrial firms tend to dissipate
resources in order to capture property.
Local governments will concentrate efforts in creating and negotiating
the concession of tax benefits, offering marginal reduction of taxation
with the expectation of increasing the total ICMS taxable basis (total
amount of transactions originated in their territory) and, thus, increasing
the volume of ICMS collected. In such attempts, local governments may
be successful in increasing their own tax collection 2 8 but always at the
29
cost of negative externalities to be supported by other states.
Private players will dissipate resources in order to capture the potential
of generating ICMS credits by allocating operations away from the point
of maximum economic efficiency. 30 To obtain and keep illegal benefits,
private players will incur higher bureaucracy and lobbying costs.

IV.
A.

CASE STUDIES

MEDICINE DISTRIBUTORS OF THE CENTER-WESTERN

REGION-DRUGS AWAY FROM HOME

The analysis of the Brazilian medicine market shows a puzzling logistical arrangement.
The medicine production industry is concentrated in the states of the
southeastern region of Brazil. Sdo Paulo alone is responsible for approximately 40 percent of all industrial production of drugs for human use in
Brazil. 31 By looking at the data in Table 01-"Medicine Sales Performed
by Sdo Paulo Industrial Plants," one may observe that approximately 76
percent (41 percent + 35 percent) of the sales (in Reais) is made to clients
located in other states of the Brazilian Federation. Such numbers are
compatible with the relationship between the population of the state of
Sdo Paulo and that of Brazil.
27. At the same time, the Tax War will increase the transaction costs of Brazilian internal trade, given that a buyer, when estimating the value of the acquired good, will
face the uncertainty of the quality of the ICMS credits generated by the seller.
28. According to CAMARGO, 2004, local governments can obtain gains from fiscal
competition, but always causing harm to other states and to the nation.
29. Rodrigo Frota de Silveira & Fabio Roberto C. Castilho, A Guerra Fiscal Que Nao
Interessa a Ninguem, Jus Navigandi, (2005), availableat http://jus2.uol.com.br/doutrina/texto.asp?id=8022.
30. The effective reallocation of resources will occur only if the net value of the appropriation of the potential to generate ICMS credits is positive. This is key to the
conclusions on the impact of Tax War on Brazilian economy and will be discussed
in Part V.
31. Minist6rio do Desenvolvimento Industria e Com6rcio, available at www.
mdic.gov.br.
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TABLE 01 - DESTINATION OF MEDICINE SALES PERFORMED
32
BY SdO PAULO INDUSTRIAL PLANTS
Sales to Buyers Located in:

In Thousands of Reais

In %

Sdo Paulo

3,700

23.5%

The Federal District, Goidis and Espfrito Santo

6,500

41.5%

Other States

5,500

35.0%

15,700

100.0%

Total

But the awkward piece of data in Table 01 is that the sum of sales to
Federal District, Goids and Espfrito Santo represent 41.5 percent of the
sales of medicines performed by Sdo Paulo plants, whereas the population of such states corresponds only to about 6 percent of Brazil's
population.
On the other hand, data in Table 02 shows that the purchases of
medicines by Sdo Paulo distributors are also awkwardly allocated. Only
29 percent of purchases are made from suppliers located in the state of
Sdo Paulo, while 67 percent are made from suppliers located in other
States. Another 4 percent are direct imports. Table 02 also shows that
around 70 percent of Sdo Paulo's interstate inflow of medicine corresponds to interstate transferences.
TABLE 02 - ORIGIN OF SdO PAULO DISTRIBUTORS
33
MEDICINE PURCHASES
In Thousands
of Reais

In %

3,067

28.8%

286

2.6%

Transfers from the Federal District, Goigs and Espfrito
Santo

5,030

47.0%

From Other States

1,821

17.0%

490

4.6%

10,694

100.0%

Origin of Sio Paulo Distributors medicine purchases
From Sdo Paulo
Purchases from the Federal District, Goids and Espfrito
Santo

Direct Imports
Total

Considering only logistical issues, there is no reasonable explanation
32. Sdo Paulo State Treasury, http://www.fazenda.sp.gov.br/. Transfers correspond to
operations in which one distribution center sends merchandise to another
distribution center of the same firm.
33. Sao Paulo State Treasury, http://www.fazenda.sp.gov.br/. Purchase value includes
transfers (except in the case of Federal District, Goids and Espfrito Santo).
Transfers correspond to operations in which one distribution center sends
merchandise to another distribution center of the same firm.
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for such characteristics of the considered market. 3 4 If logistical reasons
reveal a potential inefficiency of distributors located in Goigs, Espfrito
Santo and in the Federal District, why do these channels of distribution
have such a great participation in the Brazilian market? Even though a
complete answer to this question would demand a detailed research of
the considered market, followed by interviews with executives of manufacturers, the commercial Tax War-without a doubt-is the main reason
why drugs are so far from their natural course of distribution. In fact,
Comunicado CAT 36/2004 of the Sao Paulo State Treasury 3 5 states that
Espirito Santo, Goids and the Federal District provide illegal ICMS bene36
fits for medicine distributors.
The Federal District 37 can be an example of how commercial ICMS
benefits can affect markets. Whenever goods leave the states of the
southern and southwestern regions (with the exception of Espfrito
Santo), the ICMS rate is 7 percent. Whenever they leave a state of the
northern, northeastern, or center-western regions or Espfrito Santo, the
ICMS rate applicable will be 12 percent. So if a medicine goes from Sao
Paulo to the Federal District, Sao Paulo will charge 7 percent ICMS. If
the same medicine is sent from the Federal District to Sao Paulo, the
Federal District will be entitled to charge 12 percent ICMS and will have
to bear a 7 percent credit corresponding to the ICMS charged in favor of
Sao Paulo. The ICMS of 12 percent indicated in the fiscal documents
issued by a distributor located in the Federal District will be borne by Sao
Paulo. Sao Paulo will be entitled to charge the ICMS on later sales of the
medicine to consumers (the internal rate for medicines in Sao Paulo is 18
percent). Considering the costs of transportation, there is no reason for a
medicine to travel this far.
The Tax War changes the perspective of how distributors' gains are obtained (ICMS credit generation becomes more important than the ability
to buy and sell medicines efficiently). By engaging in the Tax War, the
Federal District decides to provide its distributors with a discount of approximately 80 percent 38 on the ICMS to be paid locally, allowing the
34. The size of the consumer market in the States of Espirito Santo, Goids and in the
Federal District is relatively small (their population represent only 6% of Brazilian
population - population is a good proxy for estimating the demand for medicines).
There are no manufactures of drugs in the mentioned States. Geographically, such
States are located away from the largest manufacturers and consumer markets
(Southeastern and Southern regions) and they are not in the way connecting manufacturers and consumer markets.
35. Comunicado CAT is a kind of alert on the content of norms edited by the chief
authority of a Brazilian State Revenue Services.
36. Rodrigo Frota de Silveira & Fabio Roberto C. Castilho, A Guerra FiscalQue Nao
Interessa a Ninguem, Jus Navigandi, (2005), availableat http://jus2.uol.com.br/doutrina/texto.asp?id=8022.
37. The ICMS illegal benefits provided by Goids and Espfrito Santo are very similar to
those of the Federal District.
38. That kind of commercial ICMS benefit described is that of Decree 20.322/99 and
Decree 24371/2004. The benefits created by the mentioned Decrees are applicable
for distributors of a series of merchandises, among which paper, foods, and
electronics.
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firms located in its territory to continue to indicate a 12 percent ICMS
charge in fiscal documents as if the tax benefit did not exist. 39 By providing the illegal benefit, the Federal District is able to attract distributors'
activity to its territory. In doing so, the Federal District increases the
local taxable basis, obtaining revenues 4 1that, otherwise, would belong to
the state of Sdo Paulo or to other states in which the medicines will be
sold to consumers. The negative externality (5 percent loss to Sdo Paulo)
is five times greater than the gains obtained by the opportunist (1 percent
gain to the Federal District). 4 1 Distributors are able to obtain a fiscal
advantage of about 4 percent, which seems to compensate for the higher
logistical and bureaucratic costs, paying for the 3000km trip a drug makes
42
before getting back to the state where it was manufactured.
The local investment made by distributors at the provider state territory tends to be low in terms of specific assets, as the assets needed for
the "medicine trip" are a small office for issuance of fiscal documents and
43
an area for transit of merchandise.
B.

BEER MALT IMPORTS IN BRAZIL

SANTA CATARINA'S BEERFEST

44

Santa Catarina is a state of the southern region of Brazil. Even though
it is relatively small in terms of territory and population, it has the second
best human development indices among Brazilian states. 45 Santa Catarina is famous for the German influence on its colonization and for its
Beerfests 46 , which, in spite of their notoriety, are not the greatest contribution of Santa Catarina to influence the Brazilian beer market.
Brazil imports malt for the manufacture of beverages, above all beer.
In 2002-2004, the total quantity of malt imported into Brazil was respectively 634, 570, and 635 thousand tons. Firms located in eight states were
responsible for approximately 90 percent of malt imports. The beer mar39. Such allowance is based on local laws and formalized in contracts celebrated between the local government and the distributors.
40. At the same time, Sao Paulo loses tax revenue corresponding to the difference
between the ICMS charged (7%) and the ICMS to be bared as credit (12%).
41. These numbers are over simplifications, due to the fact that, in the model, we do
not consider any value being added at the Federal District.
42. High value per kilogram of medicines might make the cost of transportation relatively small.
43. It is commonly reported that the medicines do not come to be unloaded from the
transporting truck, making the trip only for the purpose of fiscal documents exchanged. A mere exchange of documents without the physical dislocation of merchandise from the State of Sao Paulo is also cogitated. From the standpoint of the
provider State, the amount of tax collected will increase independently of the storage of the merchandise and of the actual physical circulation of goods. The "contracts" on ICMS commercial benefits usually do not set minimum the minimum
amount of private investments needed for the allowance of the ICMS benefit.
44. The data used to construct the tables used in the Beerfest Case was obtained at
"Aliceweb", a database administered by the International Trade Secretary
(Secretaria de Com6rcio Exterior) of Brazilian Ministry of Industry, Commerce
and Development (Minist6rio da Indtistria, Com6rcio e Desenvolvimento).
45. Source-Human Development Reports-United Nations Development Programme.
46. Blumenau's Oktoberfest is the second largest festival in Brazil (Carnaval is the
first).
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ket in Brazil is mature, experiencing small variations in quantities produced, total volume of sales, and market share of the main brands. 47 No
significant reallocation of the main manufacturer plants took place during
the three-year period.
According to the data in Table 03, whereas the total imports of Brazil
as a whole remained relatively stable from 2002 to 2004, Santa Catarina
increased its malt imports by 2800 percent, or 135 thousand tons, becoming the second largest malt importer state in Brazil.
TABLE 3 - MALT IMPORTS IN BRAZIL BY STATE
OF DESTINATION
Destination State for the imported malt

2002

A 2002 - 2004

2003

2004

5.323

41.900

141.183

135.860

ESPIRITO SANTO

76.752

190.484

181.278

104.526

PERNAMBUCO

95.911

117.448

130.921

35.010

MINAS GERAIS

39.473

31.584

22.339

-17.134

BAHIA

51.534

34.261

8.068

-43.466

PARANA

92.669

25.177

40.723

-51.946

RIO DE JANEIRO

75.015

14.690

21.224

-53.791

SANTA CATARINA

SAO PAULO

96.650

71.208

44.585

-52.065

Subtotal

533.327

526.752

590.321

56.994

Other

101.465

43.375

45.359

-56.106

BRAZIL

634.792

570.127

635.680

888

During the same period of time, imports by firms in Sdo Paulo, Rio de
Janeiro, and Parani experienced a reduction in malt imports of approximately 158 thousand tons.
In a relatively stable market, how can the variation in the malt import
chains be explained? The most important clue comes from an unusual
source. In November of 2005, the state of Parand filed a lawsuit 48 in the
Brazilian Supreme Court, complaining about Santa Catarina's ICMS regulations. These regulations create ICMS benefits not previously approved by other states. 49 Parani claims to be suffering from ICMS
revenue losses due to the reduction of the volume of its imports. 50
In order to understand the relationship between the variation in quantities of malt imported in different states and ICMS regulations, one must
47. AC Nielsen estimates the beer market share in Brazil as follows in 2005: Schincariol 13, 1% AmBer, 68% and Molson 8, 4%. Source Journal 0 Estado de Sao
Paulo, 16 of October of 2005, in "Cerveja paga imposto at tltima gota"
48. Aq5o Direta de Inconstituconalidade number 3.607.
49. Nelson's studies on Dell's incentives do not mention the illegality of ICMS benefits
not previously unanimously approved by Brazilian States. See Roy C. Nelson,
Dell's Dilemma in Brazil: Negotiating at the Sstate Level, Thunderbird Int'l Bus.

Rev.601, Sept. 1, 2004.
50. The lawsuit has not yet been decided by the Brazilian Supreme Court.
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comprehend how Brazilian imports take place and are tracked. The domicile of the importer to whom the merchandise will be destined determines the ability to charge ICMS on the import, not the point of Brazilian
territory through which the merchandise passes customs. 5 1
TABLE 04 - MALT IMPORTS TO SANTA CATARINA
BY ORIGIN
Malt imports bound for Santa Catarina by State
of Origin

2002

2003

2004

SAO FRANCISCO DO SUL (Santa Catarina)

0

36.482

83.802

83.802

0

410

39.317

39.317

5.166

5.005

18.060

12.894

SANTANA DO LIVRAMENTO (Rio Grande do
Sul) Roads
SANTANA DO LIVRAMENTO (Rio Grande do
Sul) Railways
Other
SANTA CATARINA

A 2002 - 2004

156

3

4

-152

5.322

41.900

141.183

135.861

The first line of Table 04 shows the quantities of malt imported by traders located in the state of Santa Catarina, through the seaport of Sao
Francisco do Sul, state of Santa Catarina. Such imports, inexistent in
2002, reached 83 thousand tons in 2004, dislocating a significant part (58
thousand tons) of Brazilian imports from the Port of Paranagug (Table
05).
TABLE 05 - MALT IMPORTS AT THE PORT OF PARANAGUA PARANA, BY STATE OF DESTINATION
Malt Imports through Paranagua by State
of Destination
GOIAS

2002
5.307

2003
0

2004
0

A 2002 - 2004
-5.307

PARANA

83.928

13.980

30.596

-53.332

Paranagui - Customs

89.235

13.980

30.596

-58.639

The second and third lines of Table 04 show the quantities of malt imported by traders located in the state of Santa Catarina through the customs of Santana do Livramento-Rio Grande do Sul (by railways and
roads). The quantities imported through these channels increased from 5
51. According to article 155, § 20, IX, "a'" of Brazilian 1988 Constitution. The State of
Espirito Santo is the Pioneer State in terms of ICMS Tax War on imports. There is
a major tax benefit program named FUNDAP, by which trader firms located in
Espfrito Santo can be granted with a subsidized loan of around 8% of sales. Guia
do Investidor.com, Incentivos do EspIrito Santo, http://www.vitoria.es.gov.br/
negocios/guia_investidor/incentivos es.htm. The loan is to be paid in 25 years,
with payments starting in the 6th year. Id. Interest rate is 1% yearly. Id. The
benefited firms agree to make investments in the State of Espfrito Santo. The
financial operations are made through the Development Bank of Espfrito Santo.
Id. The problem of state competition for the taxation of imports was anticipated at
"The Federalist Essays" as a potential economic inefficiency arising out of states'
taxation autonomy. The Federalist No. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
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to 57 thousand tons from 2002 to 2004. Importantly, the alteration of the
profile of the imports is legal, not physical (Table 06).
TABELA 06 - MALT IMPORTS AT SANTANA DO
LIVRAMENTO - RIO GRANDE DO SUL - BY STATES

OF DESTINATION
Santana do Livramento imports, by States of
destination

2002

2003

2004

SANTA CATARINA

5.166

5.415

57.377

PARANA

A 2002 - 2004
52.211

8.090

11.197

10.126

RIO GRANDE DO SUL

14.564

7.372

1.660

-12.904

RONDONIA

13.037

3.382

0

-13.037

SAO PAULO

43.010

24.643

2.705

-40.305

0

0

2226

83.867

52.009

74.094

Others
SANTANA DO LIVRAMENTO CUSTOMS Railway - Roads

2.036

2.226
-9.773

Table 07 shows the quantities imported by firms located in the State of
Sdo Paulo by origin.
TABLE 07 - S5O PAULO MALT IMPORTS BY ORIGIN
A 2002 - 2004

Sfo Paulo imports by origin (Customs)

2002

2003

Santos (seaport)

3,360

6,883

22,518

19,158

45,429

39,266

19,361

-26,068

320

415

14

-306

4,530

0

0

-4,530

43,010

19,210

0

-43,010

0

5,433

2,705

2,705

96,649

71,207

44,598

Sao Sebastiao (seaport)
Outros
Vitoria (seaport)
Santana Do Livramento (railway)
Santana Do Livramento (roads)
SAO PAULO

2004

-52,051

The comparison of the data in Tables 06 and 07 reveals that the most
significant part of the increase on imports of malt in Santa Catarina (52
thousand tons of a total of 135 thousand tons) comes from the "legal
alteration" of the profile of the imports occurring at Santana do Livramento customs and not from an actual alteration in the profile of malt
import logistics. During the same period, without significant changes in
physical aspects of malt market logistics, the state of Sdo Paulo experienced a "legal decrease" in the volume of imports through the Santana
do Livramento customs (approximately 41 thousand tons). The increase
in investments in Santa Catarina is very small, as beneficiary firms tend
only to have a small office for the issuance of fiscal documents in that
state.
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CONCLUSION-TAX WAR WINNERS-NORTH'S LESSONS
ON ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT

North explains poverty by stating that "[t]hird world countries are poor
because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to political
52
and economic activity that do not encourage productive activity.
As shown in Table 08, the Federal District has the highest per capita
income of the Brazilian Federation and already receives (and benefits
from) a major amount of public investment (due to the allocation of the
major structures of national public administration activities in its territory). 5 3 Santa Catarina has, by its own merits, previous to its engagement
in the Tax War, achieved the highest longevity, education, and general
HDI indexes among Brazilian states (Federal District excluded). The
State of Goigs, as seen below, is also well positioned relative to other
Brazilian states in terms of HDI.
Based on: (i) the information on the levels of development of the
states successfully engaged in the Tax War; (ii) the profile of the investments attracted by the commercial Tax War of the center western region
and (iii) the fact that Santa Catarina's engagement in the Tax War does
not even aim for the actual increase of local economic activity (as show in
the case studies); this paper has accomplished its central objective, demonstrating that the Tax War has nothing to do with reduction of regional
inequalities of the Brazilian Federation.
The concrete examples of the Tax War presented in the case studies
support the conclusion that the Tax War is a way of intensifying Brazilian
54
regional inequalities. The explanation is that, as predicted by North,
the most developed organizations (in this case states that have better
levels of development) benefit more from the flawed institutional framework, perpetuating their competitive advantages.
Despite the importance of the Tax War for intergovernmental relationships, the problems of enforcement of rules on concession of ICMS benefits5 5 transcend conflicts among governments and directly affect the way
property is valued in Brazil. Unlike the general bias of academic studies
in Brazil, a tax benefit cannot be evaluated in isolation when it comes to
its power to attract private investments. 56 Tax benefits providers com52. North, supra note 1 at 110.
53. Human Development Reports-United Nations Development Programme (2000),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/.
54. North, supra note 1,at 3.
55. Here accepted due to the actual observed impact of Tax War in Brazilian economy
and illustrated by the Medicine and Malt Cases and the lack of notice of punishment to transgressors in literature.
56. A methodological path that will lead to the conclusion that Tax War benefit are
voluntary tax expenditures leading stimulating productive activity. The mistaken
evaluation of the Tax War by the academic community is, in our opinion, a bias
towards the research on the effects of tax competition on the allocation of industrial plants. Such bias comes from the preconceived (and wrong) notion that the
Tax War is a way to achieve local economic development. Prado and Cavalcanti,
2000, evaluate the negative impact of the Tax War from the standpoint of public
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TABLE 08 - BRAZILIAN STATES HDI.

Relative
Position

State

HDI

Income HDI

Longevity HDI

Education HDI

y 2000

y 2000

1

Distrito Federal

0,84

0,84

0,76

0,94

2

Santa Catarina

0,82

0,75

0,81

0,91

3

Sio Paulo

0,82

0,79

0,77

0,90

4
5

Rio Grande do Sul
Rio de Janeiro

0,81
0,81

0,75
0,78

0,79
0,74

0,90
0,90

6

Parand

0,79

0,74

0,75

0,88

7

Mato Grosso do Sul

0,78

0,72

0,75

0,86

8

Goids

0,78

0,72

0,75

0,87

9

Mato Grosso

0,77

0,72

0,74

0,86

10

Minas Gerais

0,77

0,71

0,76

0,85

11

Espirito Santo

0,77

0,72

0,72

0,86

12

Amapd

0,75

0,67

0,71

0,88

13

Roraima

0,75

0,68

0,69

0,87

14

Rond6nia

0,74

0,68

0,69

0,83

15

ParA

0,72

0,63

0,73

0,82

16

Amazonas

0,71

0,63

0,69

0,81

17

Tocantins

0,71

0,63

0,67

0.83

18

Pernambuco

0,71

0,64

0,71

0,77

19

0,71

0,64

0,70

0,78

20

Rio Grande do Norte
CearA

0,70

0,62

0,71

0,77

21

Acre

0,70

0,64

0,69

0,76

22

Bahia

0,69

0,62

0,66

0,79

23

Sergipe

0,68

0,62

0,65

0,77

24

Paraiba

0,66

0,61

0,64

0,74

25

Piaui

0,66

0,58

0,65

0,73

26

Alagoas

0,65

0,60

0,65

0,70

27

Maranh~o

0,64

0,56

0,61

0,74

-

Brazilian Averages

0,77

0,72

0,73

0,85

-

y 2000

-

y 2000

pete against each other (some kinds of tax benefits tend to prevail over
others). Also, private firms must incur costs of acceptance of tax
57
benefits.

Measurement of return of an investment in the Tax War environment is
very complex, given that the market position to be achieved through the

investment, apparently improved by a tax advantage provided, can be
finances, mentioning institutional problems such as corruption and the creation of
monopolies. S6rgio Prado & Carlos Eduardo G. CACALCANTE, A GUERRA FisCAL NO BRASIL. IPEA, FAPESP, Edigbes FUNDAP, 2000.
57. The payment for acquiring the tax benefits will be higher transaction costs (measurement costs, lobbying and bureaucracy above others) and, maybe, some logistic
and market inefficiencies.
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suddenly modified by both the loss of the tax benefit 58 and the creation of
other tax benefits that create better conditions for competing players.
As in any other environment, the objective of players will be to win the
game, obtaining more return from their investments. The winning strategy for private firms in the Tax War environment is to capture most of the
tax advantages with the lowest possible costs. Given the risks of illegality, 59 this strategy will be associated with investing for short-term returns
based on low or no specific assets.
As observed in the first case study, the medicine distributors benefiting
from the Tax War merely acquire (or rent) a storage room for the transit
of merchandise. Such assets can have their destination changed with insignificant costs, and their acquisition does not change the fact that technology intensive investments in distribution centers will still be made
close to the consumer markets. 60 The second case study presents a mere
alteration in the legal profile of imports. Santa Catarina benefits only
from the increase in ICMS collected, generating no actual increase of eco61
nomic activity in its territory.
The Tax War does not provide for medium-term or long-term capitalintensive investments (given that the value of specific assets can be undermined by the actions of others). 62 It also increases the transaction
costs for the entire Brazilian economy.
The organizations prevailing in the Tax War environment will be those
with greater ability to associate with public agents, in order to achieve
great returns by illegally undermining the value of assets of competitors
and of other states. This advantageous association for the purpose of
fraud determines the creation of privileges and monopolies, causing Brazilian institutional framework to repel productive investments, putting
the country on a path toward underdevelopment maintenance and
intensification.
58. In spite of the inefficiency of enforcement, in special due to the slowness of the
reaction of the Judiciary, Tax War ICMS benefits have consistently been declared
unconstitutional by Brazilian Supreme Court. Theoretically there is room for private legal disputes involving competing firms based on the legal acceptance of tax
benefits. Brazilian administrative organs for the defense of concurrencies rights
have stated that illegal ICMS benefits are offenses to concorrencial markets see
Conselho Admistrativo de Defesa Economica website (CADE) 38/1999), http://
www.cade.gov.br/. No private demands based on illegal acceptance of illegal benefits actually took place in Brazil. No private demands based on illegal acceptance
of illegal benefits actually took place in Brazil.
59. Including those consistent losses caused to the clients due to tax audits on illegally
generated ICMS credits.
60. The amount of transferences of medicines to the state of Sao Paulo (line 4 of Table
02) supports the conclusion.
61. That is probably the case of Espfrito Santo's FUNDAP, the original Tax Benefit
program for imports. More complex bureaucratic activities, such as legal and accounting services do not have to be dislocated to Santa Catarina.
62. North, supra note 1, at 3. The property of those not directly involved in competition is also affected by the Tax War. Buyers will face higher transaction costs as
they worry about the quality of ICMS credits indicated in acquisition documents.
Individuals and organizations in general will face higher average levels of taxation
in order to support public expenditures increase by the effects of tax benefits.
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Even though the Tax War depends on the structure of ICMS regulations in what comes to interstate rates and credit acceptance, there are
lessons arising out of it that transcend Brazilian tax system problems. In
engaging in the formation of free trade areas or economic communities,
countries tend to be more affected by the tax policies of others. The
proper design and enforcement of rules concerning tax incentives must
always be regarded as a major issue when evaluating the possible effects
of any international agreement on trade areas; avoiding that integration,
instead of promoting development, allows opportunistic behavior to jeopardize productive investments. International agreements on income taxation must also be preceded by the evaluation of rules and enforcement
preventing opportunism, given that the issuance of fake tax receipts can
be a strategy to benefit local players at the cost of other nations.
Thus, this paper's conclusions are: (i) the Tax War is an illegal form of
opportunistic behavior which increases the tax collection of provider
states by increasing the market participation of firms with low or no relevant specific assets; (ii) the externalities arising out of the Tax War are the
loss of tax revenues for other states of the Brazilian Federation and, most
importantly, the disincentive of productive investments and general increase of transaction costs in Brazilian economy; (iii) there is no evidence
supporting the potential use of the Tax War as a tool to promote the
reduction of inequalities for the Brazilian states; (iv) the experience provided by the consequences of deficient enforcement of rules on tax benefits transcends Brazilian experience, being important for countries
intending to form or to increase the scope of free trade areas or international trade or taxation agreements.
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